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Abstract 
In a number of writings that were only narrowly circulated, Richard Wollheim took 
a stand against two pivotal theses at the centre of aesthetic reflection and, above 
all, of critical and historical-artistic practices: i) that art is a language (and thus 
artistic meaning is produced and understood in the same way as linguistic mean-
ing); ii) that art inherently is a form of communication. In Wollheim’s view, such 
theses are the mainstream conceptions shared by disciplines and approaches as 
diverse as semiotics, hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruc-
tionism, and a significant portion of cognitive science. In this paper, I mainly con-
centrate on (i) and I reconstruct, discuss and defend Wollheim’s arguments 
against a recent interpretive misunderstanding that deems them inadequate vis à 
vis Donald Davidson’s philosophy. My contention is instead that, at a closer analy-
sis, the latter works in fact as a pivot to Wollheim’s aesthetics, especially against 
the arguments put forth by Nelson Goodman, the most rigorous defendant of (i) 
and (ii). 
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1. Aesthetics and common sense  
 
The (largely unwritten) history of analytic aesthetics2 should certainly 
include the long-lasting dialogue between Nelson Goodman and Rich-
                                                          
1 andreas.welt@gmail.com. 
2 This is not to say that there are no good historical surveys, handbooks or ency-
clopedia entries on Anglo-American aesthetics and philosophy of art, as well as 
on individual thinkers; indeed, some of them are excellent, like e.g. Guyer 2014, 
whose volume 3 is particularly helpful for the topics of this article. However, 
apart from some significant exceptions (Shusterman 1987, Lopes 2016), what is 
missing to date is a specific treatment of the methodological approach that char-
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ard Wollheim, which spanned over more than two decades. Interest-
ing parallels link these two thinkers, who are, to an extent, mirror im-
ages of one another: both had an in-depth knowledge of art and its 
history (Goodman worked as a gallery director in Boston from 1929 
to 1941, Wollheim was an art connoisseur with close acquaintances 
with a number of high-profile critics and experts in attribution such as 
Adrian Stokes and Denis Mahon); both considered their aesthetic re-
flection as part of a broader philosophical enterprise (epistemology in 
Goodman’s case, philosophy of mind for Wollheim); both had a sys-
tematic and bidirectional approach to this enterprise (they did not 
concern themselves with single, self-standing questions, but inquired 
into the problem as a whole; not only did they apply tools from other 
areas of inquiry to aesthetics but also the other way round). Finally, 
they were both keen to explore usually neglected research areas 
(such as art pedagogy and its philosophical role) and were artists 
themselves (Goodman was a multimedia performer, and Wollheim 
was a novelist and memorialist)3. 
Curiously enough, also their major contributions in aesthetics 
(both published in 1968) seemed to lead parallel critical lives: as soon 
as they were published, they immediately took centre stage in the 
debate as they came to be considered foundational and paradigmatic 
of the analytic approach in the field – dispelling the misunderstanding 
that this was merely an epiphenomenon or stylistic reflection of the 
“analytic turn”; and subsequently, once they were both historically 
                                                                                                                      
acterizes such reflections as essentially analytic. It is also meaningful that even 
the most credited critical surveys on the genesis and the evolution of analytic 
philosophy (see Soames 2003, Glock 2008) tend to ignore the Anglophone con-
tributions to aesthetics (with the partial exception of Wittgenstein and Good-
man), while still granting a significant place to other of their axiological reflec-
tions, such as moral and political philosophy. This confirms Gardner’s (2014: 251) 
scepticism and suspicions that “in aesthetics and in the philosophy of art the 
practice of conceptual elucidation is not adequate to its object”. 
3 Goodman designed and realized three multimedia works: Hockey seen (chore-
ography by Martha Armastrong Gray, score by John Adams), which was recorded 
in Harvard in 1984; Rabbit, run, based on John Updike’s novel (1960, choreogra-
phy by Martha Armastrong Gray, score by Joel Kabakov); Variations: an illustrat-
ed lecture concert in which the joint showing of twenty-one variations by Picasso 
on Velazquez’s Las meninas is accompanied by a musical score and twenty-one 
variations composed by David Alpher. Variations has been frequently executed 
until recent years (see Cohnitz, Rossberg 2006: 9). Wollheim wrote the novel A 
family romance (1969) and the autobiography Germs: a memoir of childhood 
(2004). 
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situated, they still remained among the most enthusiastically re-
ceived part of their work (in fact, it must be mentioned here that 
Wollheim’s philosophy of mind, deeply influenced by Kleinian psy-
choanalysis, has been entirely ignored; and that Goodman’s irrealism 
and worldmaking, with their radically relativistic and nihilistic out-
comes, were publicly rejected by his colleague and friend W.V.O. 
Quine in a review published on a widely distributed journal). Accord-
ing to some, Goodman has not become the key figure of an influen-
tial philosophical school in the Anglophone world as Quine, Davidson 
and Dummett did because of the versatility of his production (it is this 
eclecticism that led Quine to talk about Ways of worldmaking as “a 
congeries”), and its fragmentary reception; indeed, only a few have 
studied his main works, and even fewer have been able to grasp the 
internal connections in content and method (Scholz 2009: 21). This is 
perhaps even truer of Wollheim, whose contributions to political the-
ory, philosophy of mind, aesthetics and ethics, despite their coher-
ence and mutual implications, have not been received as a unit – so 
much so that a comprehensive and introductory assessment of Woll-
heim’s thought is still sorely lacking4. So much for the similarities, 
which are non-negligible; when we come to the differences, however, 
the gap is enormous: Goodman’s strict nominalism stands versus 
Wollheim’s realist bent; Wollheim’s robust notion of the mental is 
opposed to Goodman’s phenomenalism/physicalism; Goodman’s rad-
ical constructivism contrasts with the cautious, yet not biased, Woll-
heim’s naturalism. Such foundational differences in approach natural-
ly had a profound impact on their aesthetic reflections: indeed, the 
semio-symbolic functionalism of Goodman and the contrasting prax-
iological essentialism of Wollheim yield deep ontological and episte-
mological disagreements on the status of the work of art (this comes 
to bear also on very specific aspects, such as the theory of reference 
in painting or the metaphorical meaning in visual arts or the status of 
style). It would be tempting to reduce the whole debate to what Ror-
ty (1967: 15) calls the locus classicus of the long-standing confronta-
tion between American and British philosophers, i.e. “Strawson’s crit-
icism of Carnap and his followers”. According to this criticism, if the 
declared goal is “philosophical clarification”, then “it is not a matter 
of prescribing the model conduct of model words, but describing the 
                                                          
4 However, two collections of essays discuss his thought in detail: Hopkins, Savile 
1992 and van Gerwen 2001. 
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actual conduct of actual words”, not a matter of “making rules, but of 
noting customs” (Strawson 1963: 502) – an indication that Strawson, 
as the descriptivist he is, respects also when it comes to outlining his 
own metaphysics, in opposition to Quine, the revisionist, whom 
Strawson considers one of Carnap’s main “followers”. It is well 
known, however, that Carnap himself was actually a propounder of 
the notion of “explication”, whose aim is to replace “the imprecise 
explicandum by a more precise explicatum”, which usually belongs to 
“a systematic conceptual framework”, as it is likely to find in the most 
strictly scientific portions of our language (Carnap 1963: 934-5). 
Whether Goodman’s philosophy is to be understood as in opposi-
tion to (Elgin 2001) or in continuity with (Cohnitz 2009) Carnap’s pro-
ject – especially as the latter is expressed in the Aufbau –, there is lit-
tle doubt that its principal tool is based on the notion of explication. 
This procedure leads Goodman to replace the problematic concepts 
found in ordinary language and in philosophical tradition with others 
that are capable of solving the philosophical problems arising in that 
context, even if this means that it becomes necessary to change their 
extension, whether partially or fully. One of the best known examples 
of such a change in perspective is precisely in the aesthetic field, that 
is in the abandonment of the wrong question “What is art?” in favour 
of the correct question “When is art?” – a shift that paves the way for 
a fresh approach to aesthetics. Goodman appears therefore as the 
perfect continuator of that school of ideal language that, even before 
Carnap, dates back to Frege and Russell. 
Is it therefore legitimate to simply place the British Wollheim, ed-
ucated in Austin’s and Ryle’s Oxford, within the rank of the philoso-
phers of ordinary language, so as to reduce the divergences with 
Goodman to the broader divergences of different philosophical 
schools? It does not seem so. And it is not legitimate even if we take 
into account those works that seem more promising in this sense, i.e. 
Wollheim’s very first writings in philosophy of mind and political the-
ory. Here, Wollheim appears to be completely aware of the terms of 
the debate and of the options offered by the two analytic approach-
es; moreover, he occasionally employs techniques from the ordinary 
language philosophy (description of the use, discussion of examples 
in specific tenses and modes, paraphrases). Wollheim’s method im-
mediately appears as very nuanced and characterised by flexible 
boundaries: the first phase of his philosophy indifferently employs 
Wisdom’s researches, Ayer’s works and Chomsky’s early findings, in 
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open contrast with Ryle; his political philosophy is closer to Berlin’s 
history of ideas. 
How shall we then frame the differences between these two phi-
losophers and, accordingly, between their approaches to aesthetics? 
An option is that of relating such differences to the position each of 
these thinkers assumed towards Wittgenstein, who was central for 
both philosophical schools. It is to Wittgenstein that we owe the im-
age of “philosophy as a therapy”, which Rorty used to mark the dif-
ference between those who try to formulate an ideal language from 
those who rely on ordinary language: as an instance of the former, 
Carnap was committed to replace degenerate tissues with healthy 
ones; as an instance of the latter, Strawson aimed at understanding 
whence and how the neurosis arose. This is a promising approach, 
especially given the huge influence Wittgenstein exercised on Woll-
heim’s philosophy, particularly through the mediation of Waissmann 
and George Paul – one of Wittgenstein’s pupils in Cambridge – and 
his friendship with Wittgenstein scholars such as David Pears. There is 
little doubt that Wollheim’s aesthetics owes a great deal to Wittgen-
stein5, and certainly more so than Goodman’s. However, though 
promising, this solution is not conclusive: partly because Wittgenstein 
himself never got rid, in any phase of his thought, of his ambivalent 
attitude towards the revisionist alternative (see Glock 2002: 88-91), 
partly because Goodman too was influenced by Wittgenstein’s “great 
mind” (Goodman 1978b: 504)6, to an extent. Moreover, while Witt-
genstein’s relevance for Wollheim’s thought (and particularly his aes-
thetics) was certainly durable, it also tapered off with time, and some 
differences appear more clearly over time. 
We need, then, an additional and more decisive criterion, and the 
role common sense had in the aesthetics of both thinkers might be 
an adequate candidate. Exposing the common sense’s lack of “sharp 
                                                          
5 Giovanni Matteucci brought into focus the main connections between Woll-
heim and Wittgenstein in a number of contributions: see e.g. Matteucci 2013, 
2015: 81-104, and his introduction to the Italian edition of Art & its objects. A re-
cent volume (Kemp, Mras 2016) collets papers of several brilliant scholars (to be 
sure, most of them, Wittgenstein scholars) devoted (mainly) to difficulties and 
benefits of Wollheim’s borrowing from Wittgenstein. 
6 Marchetti (2006: 15) emphasises that “notwithstanding the almost entire ab-
sence of direct references, Wittgenstein’s later thought deeply permeates 
Goodman’s reflection – starting with the relationship between explanation of 
symbolic functioning and exhibition of its inexplicitable conditions”. 
Andrea Maistrello, On the very idea of a language of art 
 
 168 
or stable boundaries” and its being “often at odds with itself” (see 
Cohnitz, Rossberg 2006: 242) was almost a part of Goodman’s mani-
festo; he even got to the point of warning the reader of his Lan-
guages of art to be “prepared to find his convictions and his common 
sense – that repository of ancient error – often outraged” (Goodman 
1968: xii, emphasis mine). Wollheim was, on the other hand, always 
faithful to the British tradition: common sense’s beliefs are central 
and not in need of justification as much as of analysis. In this sense, 
Wollheim’s reviews of two publications by G.E. Moore are particularly 
significant: namely, the reviews of Moore’s Lectures 1911-12 (1953), 
and of the posthumous Philosophical papers (1959). In particular, 
Wollheim (1953: 646) stresses the crucial passage about common 
sense becoming “the criterion, the yardstick of philosophical criti-
cism” and not one of the possible solutions that may be assigned to a 
philosophical dilemma (in a slogan: “What isn’t Common sense is, in 
philosophy as elsewhere, no sense”). 
A continuity between the standards and criteria of rationality of 
the philosophical and extra-philosophical domain follows from this, 
and philosophy of ordinary language itself originates from this ap-
proach. As it is well known, the later Wittgenstein – the other forefa-
ther of this tradition – gave this theme a personal bend: while he 
treated it in the most “systematic” and developed way in On certainty 
(see Coliva 2010), a prelude to this can already be found in the Blue 
book, which, together with the Brown book, exercised as much influ-
ence on Wollheim’s aesthetics as did the Philosophical investigations: 
“One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers – 
we read there – only by solving their puzzles, i.e., by curing them of 
the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of 
common sense” (Wittgenstein 1958: 58-9). Such a defence of the role 
of common sense in aesthetics plays an important part in a decisive 
passage of one Wollheim’s very first contributions, namely his review 
of Gombrich’s Art and illusion – a work that had a huge impact on 
Wollheim, Goodman, and analytic aesthetics in general. The gist of 
Wollheim’s criticism of Gombrich – true incubator of the notion of 
“seeing-in” – is that by positing the dichotomy between canvas and 
nature, according to which it is only possible to see either the paint-
ing’s subject or its pictorial surface (like in Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit 
illusion), Gombrich fails to provide a criterion to discriminate be-
tween conflicting and merely different interpretations; and “in the 
absence of such criterion he has no right to insist, against common 
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sense, that seeing something as a picture of an object must be some-
times to see it as a picture and sometimes to see it as that object” 
(Wollheim 1963: 29, first italics mine). 
Quite apart from the correctness of this remark (see Bantinaki 
2007, Caldarola 2011)7 what matters here is that Wollheim embraces 
a common sense observation that includes a purely phenomenologi-
cal and experiential trait in the actual encounter with the work of art. 
Wollheim’s philosophical project stands out, therefore, as a descrip-
tive report of the properly artistic experience – which is the “central 
case” in aesthetics. For, as it was openly established ever since Art 
and its objects, “we can regard objects that have not been made as 
works of art, or for that matter pieces of nature that have not been 
made at all, as though they had been: we can treat them as works of 
art. For once the aesthetic attitude has been established on the basis 
of objects produced under the concept of art, we can then extend it 
beyond this base” (Wollheim 2015, 64-5). However, this priority – 
which has been criticized (Budd 2007: 181) – has a shift in an evolu-
tionistic key in Wollheim’s later phase, when he clearly states that 
“nature is a nursery in which we learn to respond to the quality of art” 
(Wollheim 2005: 3, emphasis mine). 
In Art and its objects, the opening conundrum (“What is art?”) is 
overcome with a Wittgensteinian move: the answer is pursued not by 
seeking “a thing that corresponds to a substantive”, but by bringing 
the question “down to earth” (see Wittgenstein 1958: 1) and con-
necting it to the individual arts and the individual artistic media, in 
view, one might say, of a synoptic presentation capable of perspicu-
ously exhibiting possible similarities and clearing the way for a defini-
tion. 
In order to carry out this Wittgensteinian strategy, however, 
Wollheim turns precisely to the common experience of art and of the 
arts: “[W]e all do have in effect, already inside us, the requisite evi-
dence. Requisite, that is, for the purpose, for the comparatively lim-
ited purpose [of individuating perfunctorily what is common to the 
arts], to hand: we all do have such experience of poetry, painting, 
music, etc. that, if we cannot (as I am sure we cannot) say on the ba-
sis of it what these things are, we can at least recognize when we are 
being told that they are something which in point of fact they are 
                                                          
7 Thanks to Elisa Caldarola for discussion on this subject. 
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not” (Wollheim 2015: 2)8. His philosophical enterprise may thus rea-
sonably and pour cause be dubbed “descriptive phenomenology”9. This 
label fits Wollheim’s first-hand knowledge of the French phenomenol-
ogists (particularly Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty, but also early Sartre 
as we know him from L’immaginaire), which he often quotes in Art and 
its objects, as well as his proximity with other contemporary descriptive 
strategies, such as that of Strawson’s and Hampshire’s (all of which 
originated, in a way or another, and with different emphases, from 
Wittgenstein). Considering the most influential, i.e. Strawson’s descrip-
tive metaphysics – according to which grosso modo it is necessary to 
refer to the overall structure of thought as it manifests itself in lan-
guage in order to investigate the world’s overall structure (see Berto, 
Plebani 2015) – an affinity with Wollheim’s approach emerges rather 
clearly. In those passages of Art and its objects, for example, where it is 
discussed the ontological status of those arts that admit of multiple in-
stances and which Wollheim suggests treating as multiple tokens of a 
single type, he states clearly that “the characteristic circumstances in 
which we postulate a type” is a “question, we must appreciate, […] en-
tirely conceptual: it is a question about the structure of our language” 
(Wollheim 2015: 52, emphasis mine).  
 
 
2. Two dogmas (also) of aesthetics 
 
It is against this complex backdrop, therefore, that it is possible to 
better appreciate the differences between Goodman and Wollheim, 
especially for what concerns a key issue in aesthetics: indeed, we owe 
Goodman the most rigorous and worked out analysis of the artistic 
experience as a symbolic function, which is effectively encapsulated 
in the title The languages of art. If the phrase had not been overused, 
                                                          
8 It is worth noting that, curiously enough, also Benedetto Croce, the main critical 
target of Art and its objects, said something very similar in the celebrated open-
ing lines of his Breviario: “To the question – What is art? – we might respond in 
jest (but it would not be such a foolish jest) that art is what everyone knows it to 
be. And in truth, if in some way we were not to know what it is, we could not 
even ask the question, because every question implies a certain knowledge of 
what is being asked, designated by the question, and therefore qualified and 
known” (Croce 2007: 5). 
9 Thus Eldridge in his Foreword to Art and its objects (Wollheim 2015: ix); Matte-
ucci makes the same point in his introduction to the Italian edition. 
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one would be tempted to say that Wollheim, from Art and its objects 
on and with increasing awareness, has argued against “two dogmas” 
of art theory and, especially, of critical and art history practice, which 
have become more and more central over time: (i) that art is a lan-
guage, that is, that artworks are symbols in a symbolic system, and 
their meaning is conveyed exactly as a linguistic meaning, and, which 
is strictly connected, (ii) that art inherently is a form of communica-
tion. It was Goodman who developed these two dogmas in the most 
philosophically robust manner, although the critical and art history 
practices preferred other versions of them. These are precisely the 
polemical targets that appear in the last writings of Wollheim’s career 
when he presents his proposal as opposite to conditions (i) and (ii) as 
including indeed a much broader spectrum: “structuralism, post-
structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, what might be thought 
as ‘mainstream’ semiotics, and certain versions of cognitive science”. 
(Wollheim 1993: 185).  
It is legitimate to place, following Wollheim, under the umbrella-
term “semiotic theories” a whole spectrum of conceptions, which in-
clude the structuralist and post-structuralist theories based on Saus-
sure and Barthes propounded by Yves-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss 
(perhaps the most influential), and those inspired by Peirce, such as 
Eco’s semiotics and Goodman’s theory of symbols10. Among these, 
Goodman’s proposal possibly stands out by virtue of its ability to indi-
viduate, for each art, the typical syntactic and semantic peculiar 
traits, which is also what allows distinguishing them from the symbol-
ic system of language. In this sense, the confrontation with Goodman 
simply becomes the most advanced front of Wollheim’s battle against 
the identification art-language, for his true focus is actually the struc-
turalist and post-structuralist version of this identification (in some of 
its specific incarnations). 
It is therefore useful to restrict the whole debate to a single art 
form, closer to Wollheim’s main interests: painting. Certainly, Woll-
heim addressed the theme also in more general terms, as he master-
fully did in Art and its objects, where the analogy between art and 
                                                          
10 Goodman too, in a manner that is surprisingly similar to his French colleagues, 
asserts that “any notion of a reality consisting of objects and events and kinds es-
tablished independently of discourse and unaffected by how they are described 
or otherwise presented must give way to the recognition that these, too, are 
parts of the story” (Goodman 1984: 67, quoted in Robinson 2013: 179). 
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form of life11 is explored in its explanatory potentials and varied rami-
fications (not just the relation art-language, but also the connected 
analogy between art and information theory/code, §§45-58). Similari-
ties and differences are here investigated in depth to show that, ulti-
mately, the analogy fails to hold (also in the case of those arts that 
employ verbal language, since it is true that “we can’t understand the 
poem unless we understand the constituent words and sentences”, 
but it still remains – as Wollheim maintains – that “understanding 
what is to understand language could still leave us totally in the dark 
about what is to understand poetry”, see also Wollheim 2015: §§57-
8). Painting as an art (Wollheim 1987) also contains precise polemical 
references to its rival theories: however, within this enormously am-
bitious and erudite work, a true masterpiece in which Wolllheim’s 
philosophy of art interweaves with his philosophy of mind, action 
theory and ontology, the explicit goal is that of outlining a positive 
definition/description of the experience of painting. 
It seems more fruitful, therefore, to turn to a group of “minor” 
contributions that were explicitly devoted to this topic: Pictures and 
language, On formalism and pictorial organization and On the assimi-
lation of pictorial art to language. A couple of preliminary remarks 
are on order: firstly, it is worth noting that none of these three essays 
was targeted to an audience of philosophers, but rather of art critics 
and art historians. Wollheim used to write regularly for a number of 
journals and cultural inserts of different reviews – which partly ac-
counts for the fragmentary reception of his work already mentioned. 
Not only were his interests extremely broad and manifold, aimed at 
the most diverse subjects (from the theory of democracy to the struc-
ture of the primary unconscious process); his investigations were also 
haphazardly disseminated in a number of publications that did not 
have a wide circulation and were collected in a single volume only at 
a later stage, roughly at intervals of twenty years (if it even hap-
pened, as it was the case for Pictures and language)12. 
                                                          
11 See Wollheim 2015: 69: “Art is, in Wittgenstein’s sense, a form of life”. See 
again Matteucci 2013. 
12 Pictures and language appeared in 1989 on “Art Issue” and is now collected in 
Wollheim 1993, to which page numbering I refer in what follows; On formalism 
and pictorial organization (Formalism) was originally delivered at a conference at 
the Fondació Antoni Tàpies on September 29, 1994 and published in 1995; a new 
revised edition is now in Wollheim 2001; On the assimilation of pictorial art to 
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Secondly, this is certainly not the appropriate context to attempt a 
survey of the vicissitudes of the problem of iconicity (both internal 
and external to semiotics), nor to provide an assessment of the com-
plex relationships between aesthetics and semiotics13 – even if the 
latter were confined within the boundaries of Wollheim’s thought. In 
fact, ever since Art and its objects, Wollheim examines iconicity, 
which he ultimately analyses in terms of an “ever-increasing or deep-
ening attention” to the multiple aspects of the examined sign. More 
specifically, he claims to have “no particular dispute” with those 
scholars that give citizenship to iconic signs (à la Peirce), but to be in 
disagreement “with those radical semioticians, who hold that all 
signs, including pictures, are conventional” (Wollheim 1987: 361). 
However, he also acknowledges his debt to the art historian Meyer 
Schapiro and to his much-quoted article On some problems in the 
semiotics of visual art. Field and vehicle in image-signs (1969), which 
is often considered one of the most important antecedents of the 
Greimasian structural-generative approach to visual arts14. In what 
follows, my primary aim is rather that of sketching a positive contour 
of Wollheim’s philosophy of art and its assumptions, while remaining 
faithful both to the tradition he belongs to (i.e. analytic philosophy) 
and to his peculiar style of philosophy. 
 
 
3. Wollheim’s philosophy of language: with Davidson or against Da-
vidson? 
 
The three essays elaborate the same arguments (in some cases, liter-
ally), but Assimilation, the last one in chronological order and the 
least known, is particularly noteworthy for the detailed account of 
the relationship art-language15. 
                                                                                                                      
language 1996 (Assimilation) is a contribution to a multidisciplinary seminar on 
the status of image, which reprises certain key points from earlier contributions. 
13 This was a lively debate until the 1980’s, when it started to taper off; for an ac-
curate overview, see Calabrese 1985. 
14 It remains to be seen to which extent such a derivation is legitimate, since 
Schapiro seems to resist the idea of reducing completely the artwork’s subject to 
an intracultural and intersemiotic affair. 
15 In what follows, I stick to the line of argument developed in Assimilation, and 
refer to the other two works only when more explicit or complete on the same 
points. 
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In the opening section, Wollheim notes that, from the half of the 
Twentieth century onward, the understanding of language has made 
an impressive leap forward; he complains, however, that these find-
ings have been too often associated with phenomena that have pri-
ma facie very little to do with language, namely mythology, the un-
conscious, family ties, fashion, music, advertisements, comics, archi-
tecture and, indeed, painting. Wollheim further claims that his exam-
ination of art and language does not amount to an assessment of the 
parallels between the two activities – the linguistic and the artistic16 – 
but between their two products: on the one hand paintings, etchings, 
drawings; on the other, whatever is considered a product of the lin-
guistic dimension. 
We find here the first difficulty: should the painting be assimilated 
to a sentence, or to some of its parts? In the latter case, should it be 
assimilated to the subject or to the predicate? The first alternative, 
that is, assimilating it to a sentence, seems more promising, since, as 
Frege (“to his great credit”) pointed out, neither a subject (“noun 
phrase”) nor a predicate (“verb phrase”), mean anything if taken by 
themselves. The reference here is to the fundamental and well 
known “context principle” or “Frege principle”: “it is only in the con-
text of a proposition that words have any meaning” (Frege 1953: 
§62). We should remind that elsewhere, Wollheim explicitly declares 
his programme to belong in the Fregean tradition; he claims to have 
been “influenced by an idea that I take to be ultimately traceable to 
Frege. The idea is that […] we cannot separate the issue of what it is 
for something to have meaning from the issue of what it is that has 
meaning. An account of meaning will have something to say about 
both issues” (1991: 40)17. Moreover, if we choose to associate a 
painting with a part of the statement, there seems to be no available 
criterion to decide between subject and predicate. For example, it is 
not clear if the outstanding portrait of Madame Moitessier by Ingres 
should be paired to the subject “the woman sitting with a flowery 
dress” or the predicate “it is a woman sitting with a flowery dress”; in 
other words, it is impossible to decide whether the painting individu-
                                                          
16 Their asymmetries are already outlined in in Art and its objects, §55, and in The 
art lesson, in Wollheim 1974: 130-51. 
17 Frege’s notion of meaning is carefully explored by Eva Picardi in many of her 
work; see in particular Picardi 1981, 2010. 
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ates something about which it has nothing to say, or whether it does 
say something, though we cannot know about who or about what. 
Such indeterminacy, on the other hand, would apply also if we 
were to compare a painting with a sentence, since there is no criteri-
on that allows deciding which one among sentences with the same 
truth-value is the correct counterpart of the painting (e.g. “the wom-
an who is sitting wears a flowery dress” or “there is at least one per-
son who is sitting and wears a flowery dress” or many others). Woll-
heim concludes that there is something “inherently unstructured” 
(Wollheim 1996: 27) in what pictorial representations say, which ex-
plains the difficulty in choosing one of these sentences as appropriate 
by virtue of its possessing the appropriate structure. 
How is it possible, therefore, to liken the way paintings acquire 
meaning to the way sentences do? Wollheim exhorts to narrow the 
scope and focus exclusively on the representational meaning (Woll-
heim 1996: 29). It should be reminded that this condition, in Woll-
heim’s view, obtains not only in the case of “ordinary” representa-
tional paintings but whenever it is possible to see something tridi-
mensional on a bidimensional surface, as it happens in much abstract 
art (Wollheim 1987: 62). 
Such a restriction is of the outmost importance since the way a 
painting acquires the meaning it has depends, for a crucial part, on 
the fact that the subject represented can be seen in the pictorial sur-
face. Such a visual report of the depiction does not pertain to any-
thing but ordinary perceptual experience, that is, precisely what is 
given to common sense. 
It is equally true, however, as Goodman maintains, that common 
sense is subject to oscillations, has blurry contours and is contradicto-
ry: as a matter of fact, it has been recently argued that artistic and 
linguistic meaning may be assimilated precisely on the basis of a 
“common sense intuition” (Bermejo Salar 2013: 103-5). In the end, it 
is entirely natural, both for any art criticism and for the man on the 
street, to speak of the meaning of artworks as the result of an inter-
pretation, something that has a certain counterpart in daily linguistic 
practice. Wollheim is well aware of this, and it is from here that the 
analysis of common sense, that is, an accurate examination of these 
two intuitions, starts off. 
Wollheim insists in the first place on the eminently perceptual 
character of the pictorial experience, against the idea – endorsed by 
Goodman, but common to much of the “radical semiotics” character-
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izing György Kepes 1946, Louis Marin 1971, Eco’s Treatise 1976, 
Krauss 1981, 1985 and 1992 – that may be roughly encapsulated in 
slogans like “almost anything may stand for almost anything else” in 
the sense that “almost any picture may represent almost anything” 
(Goodman 1968: 5, 38). Wollheim underlines that the relationship 
between a horse and the word “horse” is entirely arbitrary – “a point 
famously emphasized by Saussure” – so as to stress that the matter 
stands differently when it comes to the relationship between the pic-
ture of a horse and its equine counterpart: the non-arbitrariness of 
the latter seems “quite indisputable”, regardless of the countless va-
rieties of styles and methods of projection the representational en-
deavour allows. Actually, Wollheim rehearses in Assimilation a criti-
cism to Goodman at the time of the first review (now in Wollheim 
1974: 290-314): treating paintings with null denotation as “indivisible 
one-place predicates, or class terms” entails that, for instance, in a 
“horse-representing picture” the phoneme “horse” appears exclu-
sively as a syllable, and not as a constitutive part endowed with 
meaning, which in turn entails the highly counterintuitive idea that 
“when we recognize something as a horse-representing picture, we 
do not, perhaps we cannot see a horse in the painting” (Wollheim 
1996: 31). A final consideration stressed by Wollheim concerns the 
notion of competence: recognizing the representation of a horse, al-
lows those who know how cats, dogs or elephants look to recognise 
their images, and those who do not know to learn through them, 
since “a picture-book is not only a mirror of, it is also a guide to, the 
world” (Wollheim 1974: 298, emphasis mine). 
Such a phenomenon – “transfer” in Wollheim’s phrase (1987: 77, 
1996: 187)18 – certainly does not occur in language: knowing that the 
French word cheval means horse, and knowing how cats, dogs or ele-
phants look, does not allow understanding the words chat, chien, élé-
phant upon hearing them. In Wollheim’s view, when we assign a rep-
resentational meaning to a picture, we are typically facing a one-step 
process – in which we use our eyes to see how the pictorial surface is 
painted and also to see what is represented; when we grasp a linguis-
tic meaning, by contrast, we typically go through a two-steps process 
– in which we use eyes or ears to grasp the written or verbal state-
                                                          
18 The phenomenon was first noted by Schier 1986, chap. III; see also Lopes 1996: 
70-4, Voltolini 2015: 207-8. Thanks to Alberto Voltolini for a clarifying exchange 
on this subject. 
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ment and then refer to our knowledge of language (if we possess it) 
to understand what was written or said. 
Wollheim deems such findings conclusive and “fatal to the semio-
logical view”, though he admits that one may be sceptical of purely 
epistemological arguments and thus turns to elucidating and con-
trasting the nature of pictorial and linguistic meaning. “The funda-
mental fact – he claims (Wollheim 1996: 35) – about linguistic mean-
ing is that it rests upon a certain division of labour. Part of the work is 
done by syntax, which tells us which strings of linguistic units are 
well-formed. The rest is then done by semantics, which assigns mean-
ing to well-formed strings”. Wollheim goes on to stress the conven-
tional nature of language, and the inherently stratified and highly hi-
erarchical character of rules of language, coming to the following 
claim: “it is the presence within language of this hierarchy of rules 
that ensures that linguistic meaning is essentially combinatory, and it 
is the combinatory nature of linguistic meaning that permits us to 
learn a language, and places the grasp of an infinite number of sen-
tences within the capacity of a finite mind” (Wollheim 1989: 186). 
The picture of language and linguistic competence that emerges 
from this account has been charged with being entirely regulative 
and (strictly) combinatory, almost a mathematical exercise that 
leaves no room for “any innovation, invention, creativity or imagina-
tion in our usage of language” (Bermejo Salar 2013: 106) that are in 
fact so frequent in our interpretation of others, and even in the pos-
sible experience of meaning – indeed, it is precisely this experiential 
trait that would allow likening language and art while preserving their 
peculiarities. The aim of this critique is thus to counter this too re-
strictive and misleading conception of language, and accordingly to 
harmonise the demands of aesthetic experiences with a more open 
and flexible understanding of language. In doing so, reference is 
made not only to the notion of “interpretation” and to the “principle 
of charity” developed by Donald Davidson, but also to the general an-
ti-conventional bent of his philosophy of language. In Moods and per-
formances, for example, the conventional aspect of linguistic acts is 
recognized, yet considered by itself insufficient to turn an utterance 
at the indicative mode into an assertion, or an imperative into a 
command; in Communication and convention and What metaphors 
mean, Davidson “rejects the idea that it is part of the essence of lan-
guage to be governed by rules of meaning and by conventions of var-
ious kind, to which speakers feel bound in their behavior” (Picardi 
Andrea Maistrello, On the very idea of a language of art 
 
 178 
1994: 25), and gets (more recently) to the so-called no-language the-
sis, which he provocatively (and notoriously) expresses as follows: 
“there is no such a thing as a language, not if a language is anything 
like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed” (Davidson 
2005: 107). In this perspective, Wollheim (the portrait previously 
done of his thought, at least) would undoubtedly feature among the 
philosophers critically mentioned by Davidson. Yet, it remains to be 
seen how a “Wittgenstein scholar”, who certainly did not neglect nor 
ignore the central and the so-called “second” part of the Investiga-
tions (as it is clear since the first edition of Art and its objects), may 
hold such a mechanical view of the rules of language, and one that is 
so deprived of the experience of meaning. 
Indeed, thinking of Wollheim’s relationship to Davidson in terms 
of contraposition or ignorance is entirely off the mark, for a number 
of reasons. In the first place, because Davidson is explicitly mentioned 
in the line that follows the conclusion of the preceding quote from 
Pictures and language (indeed it is precisely this mention that cor-
roborates Wollheim’s line of argument): “if sentences had to be mas-
tered like words, each time from scratch, language would lie outside 
our reach” (Wollheim 1989: 186). 
The explicit reference in the corresponding note is to Theory of 
meaning and learnable languages, in which Davidson rejects “the 
building-block theory of language learning” as an obsolete (“dusty”) 
legacy of the empiricist epistemology, to make way for the idea of “a 
learnable language [with] a finite number of semantical primitives”, 
that is, of semantic units that cannot be reduced to others – a theory 
that accounts for the fact that “an infinite aptitude can be encom-
passed by finite accomplishments” (Davidson 1984: 7-8)19. It is note-
worthy that, in his review of Languages of art, Wollheim advanced 
this line of criticism against Goodman even before using it against the 
theories that generically liken art to language. In that context, Woll-
heim used Davidson to reinforce and make explicit his objections 
against Goodman’s thesis of the unbreakability of predicates, noting 
how “by permitting what is in fact the introduction of an infinite 
number of prime locutions into the language the thesis offends 
against the basic requirement of teachability” (Wollheim 1974: 299). 
It is perhaps in response to these remarks, that Goodman later (1972: 
                                                          
19 See also Truth and meaning, pp. 17-36. For an introduction to Davidson’s pro-
gramme, see Picardi 1992b. 
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122-3) abandoned the idea of an unbreakable predicate, keeping only 
the notion of one-place predicate, meaning that, even for a “radical” 
symbol theorist, pictorial representations depict something only if 
this “something” can be recognised in them (see Lopes 1996: 44, 68-
70, Marchetti 2005: 50). Indeed, in his criticism of the building-block 
theory Davidson explicitly claims that “for example, a child learns the 
general terms ‘cat’, ‘camel’, ‘mastodon’, and ‘unicorn’ in what may 
be, to all telling, a uniform way (perhaps by paging through a picture 
book), though the child’s relation to the extensions of these terms al-
together different” (Davidson 1984: 4, emphasis mine), an idea which 
was perhaps at the root of the criticism we saw earlier. The concep-
tion of language endorsed by Davidson in the first part of his career 
thus emerges as Wollheim’s main weapon against Goodman’s ap-
proach, that is, the most robust version of the view that art is like 
language. 
Now, even if we take for granted that conventions and rules play 
an inessential role in communicating meanings – i.e. the no-language 
thesis (which is, however, disputable, since it seems reasonable to 
keep separate “the issue of understanding what a sentence says […] 
from that of understanding the content of the specific belief which a 
speaker may want to convey to a specific hearer by uttering it under 
certain circumstances” (Picardi 1997: 119-20)20 – and even if we take 
for granted that “later” Davidson’s results might undermine the 
(“early” Davidsonian) considerations pointed out by Wollheim, it 
would still be reasonable to ask what Wollheim does of the crucial 
notion of Davidson’s later programme: “the intention to be taken to 
mean what one wants to be taken to mean” (Davidson 2005: 120). It 
comes as no surprise that the notion of “intention” plays an essential 
role in Wollheim’s explanation of pictorial meaning, namely, by func-
tioning as the other fundamental part in such an explanation (the first 
being that of having a visual experience of the painting – in which one 
can in effect see a horse, as opposed to read it or decode it from the 
marks on the painting). 
                                                          
20 Clearly, such a discrepancy becomes even more evident in special linguistic 
domains, such as the legal one, or the literary one, which is more relevant to our 
case. Many pieces by Picardi are critically dedicated to the philosophy of Da-
vidson: see Picardi 1989, 1993 among others. On the no-language thesis, see the 
fundamental essays by Dummett and Hacking, collected in Lepore 1986. 
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Pictures and language goes back to the definition advanced earlier 
(Wollheim 1989: 19), according to which it is the artist’s intentions 
(or rather, the intentions the artist was capable of actually “fulfilling”) 
that establish the criterion of what can be seen in the painting: in 
other words, the parameter of correctness, against which one can 
measure what is legitimate or not legitimate to see in the artwork, 
derives from “the desires, beliefs, whishes, phantasies of the artist in 
so far as these guided the artist’s hand and are retrievable from the 
work” (Wollheim 1989: 189). While Wollheim does not find the term 
“intention” entirely adequate, he owes much of the plausibility of this 
conception to his Department colleague. Davidson’s findings in the 
field of action theory show indeed that “the reasons for which an ac-
tion is performed may be said to be its causes, and that employing 
teleological notions to describe behaviour is not in antithesis with, or 
an alternative to, employing causal notion” as summed up by Picardi 
(1992c: 19) and, as Wollheim notes (1993: 94), “the significance of 
this now obvious-seeming point is due to the work of Donald Da-
vidson”. It is worth recalling here that, contrary to ordinary desires 
and beliefs, “the mental states that are central in psychoanalytic ex-
planations […] are governed by specific laws (which in turn respond to 
the laws concerning impulses and instinctual needs) and are consid-
ered from the point of view of a conception of mental activity that 
acts oblivious to the ‘reality principle’” (Pagnini 2003: 268). In this 
theoretical framework, therefore, unconscious motives are accepted 
and (pace Wittgenstein) treated as both reasons and causes: one can 
therefore have a reason – an efficient reason, if described from the 
causal point of view – to act in a certain way, without this reason hav-
ing to be connected with the overall system of ideas, beliefs, wishes 
of the artist/agent in a logically appropriate manner – a fact of great 
significance in Wollheim’s aesthetics (and philosophy in general) im-
bued of psychoanalysis. 
 
 
4. (Partial) conclusion  
 
The point that Wollheim develops in the writings here examined (but 
that dates back to the first review of Goodman 1968) is the idea that 
the natural competence with pictures (which is one the main expli-
canda for those that reject any kind of perceptual correlations) must, 
sub specie semiotica, find a justification in something analogous, that 
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is, something structured and recursive, a sort of semantic-pictorial 
primitive. Wollheim makes it explicit through a slogan (“Semantics 
rests on syntax”) encapsulating the compositional and functional 
principles of linguistic meaning, which – in his view – do not find a 
counterpart in the pictorial-artistic sphere. This aspect too certainly 
may be ascribed to the Fregean legacy previously underlined since, in 
point of fact, Frege “theorises and prescribes the harmony between 
syntax and semantics […]. The guiding principle of Frege’s semantics 
(1893) is that semantic interpretation, that is, the pairing of extra-
linguistic entities to signs, must go hand in hand with the syntactic 
construction of statements, so that, given a complex statement, its 
semantic interpretation is a function of the semantic value of its 
components” (Picardi 1992a: 118-9). If linguistic meaning presuppos-
es that a sentence should be analysed into components and struc-
tures, how could this apply to something (like the Ingres’ painting), 
that is so radically unstructured from the syntactic point of view, so 
dependent on perception and on the perspective from which the 
artwork is seen – something, in other words, that is so unlike lan-
guage? This – purely philosophical and “negative” – line of argument 
is the lesson Wollheim has chiefly learnt from Davidson, whose influ-
ence on Wollheim (very far, then, from ignorance or contraposition) 
is equal, or perhaps even superior, to that exercised by Wittgenstein. 
Moreover, Davidson’s guiding principle of inquiry (1984: 199, see Ber-
to, Plebani 2015: 35), as it is famously stated – i.e. “one way of pursu-
ing metaphysics is therefore to study the general structure of our 
language” since “in sharing a language […] we share a picture of the 
world that must, in its large features, be true” –, seems definitively 
consonant to the descriptive analysis, corroborating thus common 
sense intuitions, favored by Wollheim. However, there are some 
deeper, more “positive”, reasons for Wollheim to reject the assimila-
tion of art to language and communication which will be object of a 
future examination (Maistrello 2018). 
The point here is not that much (or not only) whether language 
actually functions in the way Wollheim describes; the point is that 
this is the way the upholders of the semiotic view must assume in or-
der to be consistent with their own premises. And with Davidson 
(1984: 8-9), we might put it as follows: for something to be a lan-
guage, it must be learnable; and for something to be a learnable lan-
guage, certain “empirical assumptions” must be respected: “for ex-
ample, that we do not at some point suddenly acquire an ability to in-
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tuit the meanings of sentences on no rule at all; that each new item 
of vocabulary, or new grammatical rule, takes some finite time to be 
learned; that man is mortal”.  
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